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NOTES & COMMENTS
PROVING DISCRIMINATORY INTENT FROM A
FACIALLY NEUTRAL DECISION WITH A
DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is often
employed by individuals2 to curtail governmental action' which discrimi-
nates against persons for illegitimate reasons.' Governmental actors have
frequently attempted to discriminate against people through classification
of those people,5 or through facially neutral decisions6 with dispropor-
tionate impacts.' Whether a decision creating a classification8 actually
' U.S. Coasr. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 Plaintiffs employing the equal protection clause to remedy discriminatory state action
are usually members of minority groups. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977)
(Mexican-Americans); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (blacks); In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717 (1973) (aliens). A substantial amount of recent litigation, however, has involved
white male plaintiffs. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978);
Wright Farms Constr. v. Kreps, 444 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Vt. 1977); Associated Gen. Contr. of
Cal. v. Secretary of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Cal. 1977), vacated, 98 S. Ct. 3132
(1978). A minority plaintiff can rely on the equal protection clause when denied equal treat-
ment or equal status because of his historically disadvantaged position in society. A denial
of equal treatment occurs when similarly situated individuals are treated differently without
substantial reasons. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941).
See also L. TRIBE, AMERicAN CONSIrTMONAL LAw 992-93 (1978) (hereinafter cited as TIBE];
Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure
Distinction, 86 YALE L. J. 317 (1976) [hereinafter cited as De Facto/De Jure]. A minority
group member is denied equal status when he is treated as whites are treated, when he should
be given an advantage. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2798-806
(Marshall, J., dissenting). White plaintiffs, as members of the dominant class in society, may
only challenge the denial of equal treatment.
The fourteenth amendment limits only state action and not private action. Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
See note 9 infra.
See note 8 infra.
A facially neutral decision appears neutral on its face if it neither creates a "suspect
classification" nor infringes on a "fundamental right." See note 8 infra. To be constitutionally
recompensible, however, the facially neutral decision must have a disproportionate impact.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-46 (1976); note 7 infra.
I A decision results in a disproportionate impact when the adverse effects of the decision
fall more heavily on a minority group than on whites. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385,
391 (1969). In the context of employment, for example, a disproportionate impact results
when more minority group members than whites are disqualified for employment by an
examination or job qualification. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237 (1976); note 83
infra.
K State and federal governments commonly employ three methods to classify individuals.
The first, suspect classifications, is constitutionally impermissible because such classifica-
tions are based on criteria inappropriate for governmental consideration. See In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973). In the past, suspect classifications were limited to discrete and
insular minoities who would not be protected by the regular operation of the political process.
United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). This implies that a suspect
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violates the equal protection clause depends upon the government's justifi-
cation for that decision.' A facially neutral decision, however, necessitates
classification would not include a group with considerable political power. The Court has
rejected this approach, however, in its most recent pronouncement in the area. See Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2747-48 (1978). Significantly, the Supreme Court
has not yet defined the components of a suspect classification. Recent commentators have
detailed the characteristics to include the direction of the classification toward a recognized
minority, the tainting of the affected minority as inferior, and the attribution of the features
upon which the classification is based to the members of the minority. Note, A Question of
Balance: Statutory Classifications Under the Equal Protection Clause, 26 STAN. L. REv. 155,
161-63 (1973); Note, VASAP: A Rehabilitation Alternative to Traditional DW Penalties, 35
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 673, 686 n. 102 (1978). Suspect classifications have been held to include
alienage, see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
371-72 (1971); race, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967), and national origin or
ancestry. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948).
Another impermissible governmental classification is one that infringes on a constitu-
tionally protected "fundamental interest." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
Such an interest has been defined as any right "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
constitution." San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 441 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). The
Supreme Court decisions reflect on ad hoc decision making procedure, however, and have
offered little guidance in identifying the presence of fundamental interests. See Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. at 662 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Judicially defined fundamental interests
include interstate travel or migration, see Memorial Hosp. v. Naricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,
254 (1974), voting rights, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972), access to the courts
for criminal appeal, see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956), and procreation. See Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). However, public employment, see
Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976), education, see San Antonio
Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34-35 (-1973), welfare benefits, see Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972), and housing, see Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74
(1972), have been denied the status of fundamental interests.
Other governmental decisions often create classifications but do not create suspect classi-
fications or infringe on fundamental interests. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (age); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54
(1973) (wealth). The government's use of such classifications violates no constitutional rights.
The standard of review employed to examine the governmental creation of a suspect
classification or infringement of a fundamental interest is strict scrutiny. See Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2747 (1978). In these situations, the presumption of
validity afforded most state enactments is abandoned, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
426-27 (1961), and the burden shifts to the governmental actor to prove that the action
furthers a "compelling governmental interest", Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969) (emphasis in original), and that no available alternatives are less detrimental to the
interests of the plaintiff. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263 (1974).
The traditional standard of review of a suspect classification may have been changed in
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978). In Bakke, the Supreme Court
stated that the state must show only that the classification is "necessary. . . to the accom-
plishment of its purpose or the safeguards of its interests." Id. at 2756-57; see In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1973). The state also must justify action that infringes on a fundamental
interest by showing a compelling state interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969); see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972). If the governmental action does not
create a suspect classification or infringe on a fundamental interest, the action will be upheld
as long as the action bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. San
Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971). Governmental enactments have usually been upheld under this test if any conceivable
set of facts will suffice to justify the decision. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426
(1961); see Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948). Therefore, under this test the govern-
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a different approach. In Washington v. Davis'0 and Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., I the Supreme Court
held that a facially neutral decision with a disproportionate impact on a
judicially defined minority group violates the fourteenth amendment only
if the governmental actor has the intent or purpose to discriminate. 3 Al-
though Washington and Arlington Heights overruled a substantial body of
case law developed by the lower federal courts," the Supreme Court did
ment's burden of proof appears to be negligible, since any legitimate end may serve to support
the decision.
As a result of the rigid application of this two-tiered analysis by the Supreme Court, see
P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. Howe & E. BROWN, CONSTrruTioNAL LAw 914 (4th ed. 1977);
Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther], the outcome of a case
involving equal protection hinged on the Court's decision to employ strict scrutiny or a
rational basis standard of review. If strict scrutiny was employed, the plaintiff invariably won,
whereas under a rational basis examination the government usually prevailed. Compare
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (strict scrutiny) with Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970) (rational basis). There has developed, however, a middle tier between the
strict scrutiny and rational basis review. Gunther, supra at 18-19; see Schwemm, From
Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection
Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 961 [hereinafter cited as Schwemm]. The Court has employed
the middle tier of review when the classification is based on sex or illegitimacy. See Trimble
v, Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (illegitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (sex). While
these classifications do not infringe upon a fundamental right and are not suspect, the govern-
ment must assert more than a rational basis to sustain their existence. See Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. at 772; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 200.
II 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
" 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
12 The adverse effects of a facially neutral decision must rest upon a judicially defined
minority group. 426 U.S. at 248. Otherwise governmental classifications such as a'graduated
income tax or welfare plan, which benefits or burdens unequally, would violate the fourteenth
amendment. Id. See also Beauchamp v. Davis, 550 F.2d 959, 961 (4th Cir. 1977). In United
Jewish Organ. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), the Court held that a purposeful use of racial
criteria by the legislature restructuring voting districts is constitutionally permissible only
when done to preserve black majorities in particular distiicts. Id. at 161. The adverse effects
of the decision in Carey fell on whites, not members of a racial minority. Therefore, no
judicially defined minority group had demonstrated a constitutional injury. See Ely, The
Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 723, 724 (1974). But
see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
11 426 U.S. at 239. The Washington Court addressed only those decisions which are
neutral on their face. See text accompanying notes 20.35 infra. Therefore, the intent require-
ment of Washington would not be relevant to a statute that creates a suspect classification
or infringes upon a fundamental right. After some uncertainty in this area, see Note, The
Village of Arlington Heights: Equal Protection in the Suburban Zone, 14 HASmNGS CONsT.
L. Q. 361 (1977), the Court established that intent in these situations is to be inferred from
the actual establishment of a suspect classification or by the infringement upon a fundamen-
tal right. In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978), the Court stated
that "Ithe University's special admissions program involves a purposeful, acknowledged
use of racial criteria. This is not a situation in which the classification on its face is racially
neutral, but has a disproportionate impact. In that situation, plaintiffs must establish an
intent to discriminate..." Id. at 2748 n. 27.
11 The majority of federal courts had reasoned that disproportionate impact alone was
enough to establish a fourteenth amendment violation. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw,
437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (1972); Kennedy Park
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not address the question of what constitutes discriminatory intent, and
what evidence a fact-finder should consider in making such a determina-
tion. Due to the Court's ambiguity before Washington,5 the lower federal
courts employed myriad approaches in reaching conclusions regarding in-
tent. 16
Whether an actor has the intent to discriminate depends on many
factors. The approach most often used by the lower federal courts to parse
these factors and to determine intent has been to apply a "foreseeable
consequences" test 7 or an objective standard of intent. 8 However,
thoughtful analysis of the facts, language and rationale of Washington and
Arlington Heights leads to the conclusion that a more exacting measure of
intent was required by the Court. Only intentional action violates the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The governmental
decision-maker must specifically intend to discriminate or have the intent
necessary to commit an intentional tort" before a court may find that the
actor acted with a discriminatory intent or purpose."0 The Supreme Court's
mandate under the fourteenth amendment2' and its related areas22 could
Homes Assn. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010
(1971); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
11 Compare Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1971) (intent not necessary for
constitutional violation) and Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (intent not necessary)
with Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (intent necessary) and Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (intent necessary).
" See notes 72-74 infra.
See, e.g., United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 413 (7th Cir. 1978);
Armstrong v. O'Connell, 451 F. Supp. 817, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1978); see text accompanying notes
60 & 65 infra.
" See text accompanying note 60 infra.
" See id.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976).
23 Although Washington established the requirement of intent before concluding that a
facially neutral decision violates the equal protection clause, the first decision dealing with
the fourteenth amendment established this precept in the context of jury exclusion. Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); see Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Carter
v. Jury Comm'n., 396 U.S. 320 (1970). The prerequisite of intent under the fourteenth amend-
ment applies to other areas of equal protection, including racial gerrymanding of reapportion-
ment statutes, Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), and school desegregation. See, e.g.,
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). "[A] current condition of segregation
resulting from intentional state action . . ." id. at 205, must occur before desegregation is
accomplished through the fourteenth amendment. Such segregation is commonly known as
de jure segregation. Id. at 208; see Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1971). De
facto segregation is defined as all other types of segregation and results from zoning practices,
residential housing patterns, and "freedom of choice school systems" in which each child
picks his particular school. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 211-12 (1973).
2 Closely related to the fourteenth amendment are 42 U.S.C. §§1981 and 1983 (1976).
Section 1983 states:
[elvery person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall




be particularly damaging to plaintiffs, as all school desegregation cases
and the vast majority of cases that allege infringement of personal liberties
are brought under the equal protection clause.
The Supreme Court reestablished the intent requirement in fourteenth
amendment litigation in Washington v. Davis.Y In Washington, two un-
successful black candidates24 for positions in the District of Columbia Met-
ropolitan Police Department challenged the Department's recruitment
procedures.Y The plaintiffs, who failed to obtain jobs with the Police De-
partment, claimed that the procedures resulted in a harmful and dispro-
Since § 1983 is based on the fourteenth amendment, several lower federal courts have held
that a violation of § 1983 requires intent. See, e.g., Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F.
Supp. 949, 963 (D. Md. 1977); Guardians Ass'n of N.Y. City v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 431 F.
Supp. 526, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
In addition, the intent requirement has been employed in cases decided under the thir-
teenth amendment. Section 1981, which states that:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens...
is based on the thirteenth amendment rather than the fourteenth amendment. Lewis v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949, 964 (D. Md. 1977). Some courts have held that
discrimination under § 1981 also requires proof of intent. See, e.g., id. at 963; Johnson v.
Hoffman, 424 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Mo. 1977), affld, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978). But
see Note, Racially Disproportionate Impact of Facially Neutral Practices-What Approach
Under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981 and 1982? 1977 DuKE L. J. 1267.
Certain statutory provisions including the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3603
(1976) and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1976) do not require proof of discriminatory intent.
See Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F. 2d 1283 (1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978) (housing); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
(employment). To establish a prima facia case of .racial discrimination under Title VII, a
plaintiff must prove that he belongs to a racial minority, that he applied and was qualified
for a job in which the employer was seeking applicants, and that he was rejected despite his
qualifications, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applications from persons with the plaintiff's qualifications. McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). To establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act, a plaintiff
must prove that there is strong evidence of discriminatory effect, that there is some quantum
of evidence of discriminatory intent, although not as much intent as required under
Washington, and that the plaintiff is seeking to compel the defendant to provide housing for
minority group members or otherwise restrain the defendant from interfering with private
individuals who desire to provide such housing. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d, 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977).
n 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
24 In Washington, the complaint was originally filed by black police officers against the
Commissioner of the District of Columbia, the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department
and the Commissioners of the United States Civil Service Commission challenging the De-
partment's promotion practices. Id. at 232. The unsuccessful applicants intervened as plain-
tiffs pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 24. 426 U.S. at 232.
21 The Department's disputed recruitment procedure required employees to pass the
same competitive civil service examination that is used throughout the federal system. 426
U.S. at 234. The Civil Service Commission developed the examination, known as "Test 21",
to test the applicant's verbal ability, working vocabulary, and reading and writing skills.
Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 16 (D.D.C. 1972).
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portionate impact on blacks"6 sufficient to establish a violation of the equal
protection clause implicit in the fifth amendment.Y The plaintiffs did not
allege discriminatory intent on the part of the Police Department or at-
tempt to prove that the Police Department intended to discriminate.2 The
Court held, however, that a facially neutral statute or decision2 is not
subject to attack under the equal protection clause simply because the
decision has a disproportionate impact on a minority group. 0
The Washington decision increased the burden of proof for plaintiffs
advancing claims under the fourteenth amendment, clearly establishing
the proposition that plaintiffs must prove that a governmental decision-
maker acted with the intent or purpose to discriminate before a facially
neutral statute violates the equal protection clause.3 1 The Court did not,
however, provide any guidelines to identify what actions would establish
such a discriminatory intent or purpose, or whether the fact-finder should
" The examination developed by the Civil Service Commission eliminated four times as
many blacks as whites. 426 U.S. at 237. A generally accepted theory of educators maintains
that whites will perform better than blacks on a standardized test, since these tests are
usually developed by whites whose subconscious racial biases are reflected in the examina-
tions. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 448 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd en banc sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional
and Policy Implications of Student Classifications, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 705, 769-70 (1973);
Note, Segregation of Poor and Minority Children into Classes for the Mentally Retarded by
the Use of IQ Tests, 71 MICH. L. Rav. 1212, 1213 (1973).
7' U.S. CONsr. amend V. The due process clause of the fifth amendment contains an
equal protection component. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Bolton v. Harris,
395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The plaintiffs in Washihgton were required to bring their claims
under the fifth amendment since the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the federal
government. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 8 (1948).
"I The plaintiffs apparently proceeded on the theory that intent was unnecessary to
establish a constitutional violation. In addition, no claim was advanced under Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1976), which was inapplicable to federal government employment at the time
the complaint was filed. Title VII has been subsequently amended to apply to the federal
government and the District of Columbia. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976).
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on both constitutional
and statutory grounds, Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.D.C. 1972), holding that
the Department's procedures were directly related to the requirements of the recruit training
program. Id. at 17. In fact, the district court believed that Test 21 was accomplishing its
purpose by disqualifying those individuals who could not communicate effectively enough to
be policemen. Id. The circuit court reversed stating that the case should be decided under
Title VII standards. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 229
(1976). The court reasoned that discriminatory intent was not controlling and the determina-
tive factor was the disproportionate impact of the Department's recruiting procedures. Id. at
958; see notes 21-22 supra.
2 See note 6 supra.
426 U.S. at 242. The Court expressed concern that a large number of governmental
decisions would be invalidated because they impinged more heavily on one race than another.
Id. Almost any activity which parcels out the government's finite resources burdens or bene-
fits one group more than another. The Court listed taxes, welfare, public services, and regula-
tory and licensing statutes as governmental enactments that would be invalidated if constitu-
tional violations could arise without a prior finding of discriminatory intent. Id.
31 See note 21 supra.
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consider objective manifestations of intent"2 or subjective motivations"3 of
the individual decision-maker. Nevertheless, the majority consistently
used the word "purpose" rather than "motive" when discussing the plain-.
tiff's burden of proof.34 This careful choice of language differed from earlier
cases dealing with intent. Discussion of a law's purpose implies that
objective facts are the relevant considerations, whereas a consideration of
motive requires that the incentives of the individual decision-makers be
scrutinized. As a result, the Court implicitly emphasized objective factors
rather than subjective elements of intent. This objective facts approach
offered few guidelines in proving a fourteenth amendment claim to a plain-
tiff who must satisfy the intent requirement.
The Court attempted to promulgate much needed guidelines and clar-
ify its position on the intent requirement in Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.37 In Arlington Heights, the
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation [MHDC] planned to
build federally subsidized," low income housing in Arlington Heights, Illi-
nois. MHDC could not build the racially integrated housing project" un-
less Arlington Heights rezoned the proposed site to permit construction of
multi-family dwellings.4" When the Village refused to rezone the site,
" See note 53 infra.
See note 60 infra.
426 U.S. at 242-44, 247. The purpose of a statute might be those goals a decision-maker
wants to obtain "by the operation of the statute," whereas the "act of his vote" may be
motivated by other objectives. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitu-
tional Law, 79 YALE L. J. 1205, 1218 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Ely]. See generally
Schwemm, supra note 9, at 1004.
In Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), the Court used the words
"intentional", "deliberate", and "purpose" when speaking of the governmental actor's neces-
sary frame of mind before finding a constitutional violation. Id. at 198, 210, 213. In Palmer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971), the words "motivation" and "purpose" were
employed, while in Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435,445 (1970), "motivation" and "intent" were
discussed. See Ely, supra note 34 at 1213-14.
See Schwemm, supra note 9, at 1004.
429 U.S. 252 (1977). In Washington, the majority opinion expressed its "disagreement"
with the circuit court's holding in Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), to the extent that discriminatory purpose was unneces-
sary for proof of a fourteenth amendment violation. 426 U.S. at 245. Therefore, the Court had
effectively overruled Arlington Heights before the case was actually considered.
MHDC's proposed housing project was to be subsidized under § 236 of the National
Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 17152-1 (1970 ed. Supp. V.). New subsidies under § 236 were
terminated by the government in 1973. However, those eligible under § 236 became eligible
for aid under § 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1932. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1970 ed. Supp.
V.).
, 429 U.S. at 257. A housing project must be racially intergrated to qualify for a housing
subsidy under § 236. Id.
11 Id. The basic zoning plan of Arlington Heights applied single-family classifications to
all unused land. Schwemm, supra note 9, at 1028. As specific applications for rezoning were
presented, the Village decided whether to rezone an area from the single-family to the multi-
family category. Id. In the years before MHDC's petition for rezoriing, the Village approved
sixty rezoning petitions, representing over 5200 market-rent apartments. Id. at 1020. Upon
consideration of MHDC's petition, the Village Plan Commission held public meetings which
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MHDC and three black residents of Arlington Heights sued to compel the
Village to rezone. 1 The Supreme Court held that a discriminatory purpose
had to be a "motivating factor"4 behind the action of the governmental
allowed various citizens to express their opinions on the proposed zoning change. 429 U.S. at
257-58. However, the Court was pursuaded by the fact that the zoning change would further
Arlington Heights' official zoning policy of using multiple-family areas as buffers between
single-family areas and commercial or manufacturing districts. Id. at 270. The Court viewed
the official zoning policy as a legitimate goal of the Village. Id. Thus, discriminatory decisions
could be justified as a means to accomplish a legitimate end. See note 43 infra.
" 429 U.S. at 271. The plaintiffs alleged a violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment in addition to a violation of the Fair Housing Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3603 (1976). In a procedure later termed "unorthodox" by the United States Supreme Court,
however, the circuit court decided only the constitutional issue and did not address the
statutory question. 429 U.S. at 271; see note 44 infra.
The district court concluded that the village had a legitimate interest in preserving the
zoning plan and that the Village's desire to protect property values should be respected.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D.
Ill. 1974). Although the district court judge did not decide the issue of intent, he stated that
the decision to deny rezoning was not "arbitrary or capricious." Id. If the defendants acted
with the "legitimate desire to protect property values and the integrity of the Village zoning
plan," id., they could not have had the intent to discriminate. The circuit court reversed,
reasoning that the Village's decision should be analyzed by taking into account the context
of the situation existing in Arlington Heights and the cumulative effect of the decision on
minorities in the area. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517
F.2d 409, 413 (7th Cir. 1975). After considering all relevant factors, the court concluded that
the disproportionate impact of the Village's decision was a violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id. The fact that the Village had rezoned from single-family to multi-family areas on
sixty different occasions from 1959 to 1970 for market-rent apartments was crucial to the
court's decision. Id. at 412.
11 429 U.S. at 265-66. Discriminatory intent must be one of the factors influencing a
decision before a constitutional violation occurs. However, such intent need not be the sole
motivation of the decision-maker. Id. at 265. The Court recognized that numerous considera-
tions often coalesce before a decision is reached, especially in the legislative or administrative
process. Id.; see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95, 119.
11 429 U.S. at 270 n. 21. After discriminatory purpose has been established, the govern-
ment may prove that the same action would have been taken without involving the discrimi-
natory purpose. Thus, the defendant must introduce evidence of other possible justifications
for the decision. The defendant tries to prove that his intent was irrelevant, rather than the
absence of discriminatory intent. This concept emphasizes the reluctance of the Court to
remedy situations other than those exclusively caused by intentionally discriminatory state
action. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); note 21 supra. If the situation were not
specifically caused by discriminatory governmental action, the fourteenth amendment can
not be used to justify a federal court's interference with the operation of a state's government.
429 U.S. at 270 n. 21.
The Court followed this reasoning in a first amendment context in Mt. Healthy City Bd.
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In Mt. Healthy, a school teacher was not rehired when
he exercised a constitutionally protected right. After receiving a memorandum from his
principal concerning the establishment of a dress code for teachers, the plaintiff informed a
local disc jockey who promptly announced the adoption of the dress code as a news item. Id.
at 282. One of the reasons for not rehiring Doyle was that the disclosure violated school policy.
Id. at 282-83. Both the district and circuit courts agreed that Doyle had a constitutionally
protected right to disclose the adoption of the new dress code and that the refusal to rehire
him constituted a violation of the first amendment. Doyle was reinstated with back pay and
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decision-maker. After a finding that discriminatory purpose motivated the
governmental actor, the burden then shifts to the defendant to demon-
strate that the same decision would have been reached even if the imper-
missible purpose had not been considered. 3 The plaintiffs in Arlington
Heights, however, failed to prove that discriminatory intent was a motivat-
ing factor in the government's decision," and therefore failed to establish
a violation of the equal protection clause.
In Arlington Heights, the Court affirmed the intent requirement in
fourteenth amendment adjudication. The importance of the opinion can
be discerned from the Court's attempt to specify the types of evidence a
fact-finder should consider when deciding whether a governmental actor
has acted with discriminatory intent. The categories of evidence delineated
by the Court as probative of the motivation of a decision-maker are the
impact,45 the historical background," the specific sequence of events,47 any
damages. Id. at 283. The Supreme Court agreed that the disclosure was the exercise of a first
amendment right, but disagreed with the lower courts on whether Doyle was necessarily
entitled to relief. Id. at 285. The Court remanded the case to afford the school board the
opportunity to introduce proof that it would not have rehired Doyle, who had severe discipline
problems in the classroom and several disagreements with the principal, regardless of the
telephone call. Id. at 287. This method of analysis insures that the court is correcting only
those adverse effects of a constitutional violation that are detrimental to the plaintiff.
11 429 U.S. at 270. The Arlington Heights Court remanded the case for consideration of
the statutory issue ignored by the circuit court. 429 U.S. at 271. On remand, the Seventh
Circuit held that the discriminatory intent requirement of Washington was not necessary to
establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§3601-3603 (1976) and that the
disproportionate impact of the Village's refusal to rezone constituted a statutory violation.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1289-90 (7th
Cir. 1977). This is essentially the same standard the Supreme Court has employed to decide
cases under Title VII. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971); United
States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 435 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); note
19 supra. Consequently, a situation now exists in which opposite results may be obtained from
the same set of facts. While the Fair Housing Act was enacted to prevent discrimination in
the building, sale or rental of housing, 42 U.S:C. § 3604 (1976), the Act is based on the
thirteenth amendment. United States v. Nintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1313 (D. Md. 1969).
Some courts specifically have held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which is also based on the thirteenth
amendment, requires that the actor have the intent to discriminate. Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949, 963 (D. Md. 1977); Guardians Ass'n of N.Y. City v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 526, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Therefore, in a seemingly inconsistent
interpretation, some statutes based on the thirteenth amendment require intent, while others
do not.
11 429 U.S. at 266. Whether an action's adverse effects burden one race more than another
constitutes the threshold issue when analyzing a facially neutral statute challenged under the
equal protection clause. Id. at 266. If the action does not have a disproportionate impact on
a judicially defined minority group, see note 12 supra, no equal protection violation exists.
Id. The Court did not, however, indicate what the threshold level of disproportionate impact
would be. In Washington, four times as many blacks as whites failed the recruitment exam.
426 U.S. at 237; see note 26 supra. In Arlington Heights, the denial of rezoning resulted in a
disproportionate impact since more minority group members were affected than whites. 429
U.S. at 269.
11 429 U.S. at 267. The historical background of the Arlington Heights decision revealed
that the property in question had been zoned for single-family residences since 1959 when
Arlington Heights initiated its zoning procedures. Id. at 269; see note 40 supra. In
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departure from normal procedures," and the legislative or administrative
history.49 The majority opinion, however, offered no guidelines for weighing
such evidence. Moreover, the Court did not indicate what inferences
should be drawn from any particular fact pattern. This is particularly
troublesome since the evidence upon which a plaintiff must rely often
consists of commonplace occurrences. Therefore, an inference of discrimi-
natory or non-discriminatory intent may be drawn from any particular
piece of evidence."0 The crucial question virtually ignored by the Court in
Arlington Heights involves the type of intent a plaintiff is required to
prove. A defendant might have had the specific intent to discriminate
against a plaintiff,5 ' or he may have merely realized the foreseeable conse-
quences of his actions.52 This determination has become the critical ques-
tion in litigation involving a facially neutral statute with a dispropor-
tionate impact.
The determination of intent has emerged as the starting point in equal
protection litigation. However, intent is an amorphous concept. In a negli-
gence context, intent refers to the performance of an act. 3 An actor does
not desire to accomplish a specific purpose when he is negligent, but
merely intends to perform the act which he in fact performs. His intent is
to act, not to accomplish a result. He is negligent because the law assumes
that he realized the foreseeable consequences of his action. 4 Such objective
proof of intent requires evidence which demonstrates the actor's knowledge
of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his actions. 5 If a court ac-
Washington, the facts indicated that the recruitment test was not developed by the Police
Department, but was a general test given throughout the federal civil service system. 426 U.S.
at 234.
,7 429 U.S. at 267.
Id.
I d. at 268. The legislative or administrative history of the decision is particularly
important if the decision has been made recently. Examples of such history deemed impor-
tant by the Court are contemporary statements by members of the decision making body,
minutes of the meetings, and reports or testimony of the members of the decisionmaking
body. Id.
"* See text accompanying notes 106-14 infra.
51 See text accompanying notes 60-70 infra.
'2 See text accompanying notes 56-59 infra.
11 The actor need not intend to bring about a particular result to be negligent. He needs
only to intend to act in the manner in which he in fact acted. The performance of an act is
sufficient to constitute negligence because the standard to which the actor must conform is
that of the reasonable man. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER]. The objective facts approach looks to the physical acts, and not the moral
turpitude of a particular actor because society does not inquire about the subjective motiva-
tions of the individual actor.
If a reasonable man would have recognized the consequences of the action, the law
assumes that the particular actor also should have recognized these consequences. See Terry,
Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1915). If the actor voluntarily performed the act, he is
negligent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT].
" See PROSSER, supra note 53, at § 32.
See, e.g., Feeney v. Commonwealth, 451 F. Supp. 143 (D. Mass.), review granted, 97
S. Ct. 345 (1978); Armstrong v. O'Connell, 451 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
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cepts this standard in deciding fourteenth amendment cases, proof of a
disproportionate impact would also prove discriminatory intent, since in
most conceivable situations the consequences of an act are known.51 In
continuing to act after foreseeing the consequences of his action, the gov-
ernmental actor's intent would be inferred from the performance of the act.
Therefore, the plaintiff needs only to prove that the particular act was
voluntary. Even if the consequences of an action are not known at the time
of the action, the effects would be known soon thereafter, and the dispro-
portionate impact would continue if the actor did not correct the original
decision. Thus, if an actor allowed a decision to stand and knew that the
decision had a disproportionate impact, the actor would be deemed to have
the requisite discriminatory intent under the foreseeable consequences
approach. 7 Therefore, the plaintiff would need only to prove that the
actor's decision to refrain from correcting his former action was voluntary.
Moreover, if courts adopt the foreseeable consequences or negligence stan-
dard of intent, there would be no significant barrier to plaintiffs alleging
fourteenth amendment violations." The plaintiff would be able to prove
his case by proving that the act in fact occurred. In reality, this approach
is equivalent to the impact test that was specifically rejected by the Su-
preme Court in Washington and Arlington Heights.59
Since disproportionate impact alone will not prove that a facially neu-
tral statute violates the fourteenth amendment, a plaintiff must prove that
a governmental decision-maker had the specific intent to discriminate. 0
54 See note 53 supra. In Arlington Heights, the foreseeable consequences of the failure to
rezone were apparent to all parties. If the Village did not rezone, there would be no housing
project. Yet, the Court did not find that the Village intended to discriminate. 429 U.S. at
270.
7 Once a determination is made that the decision-maker had a duty to act, the failure
to act may constitute a constitutional violation. See Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238,
246 (5th Cir. 1978). In Washington, the Police Department knew that four times as many
blacks as whites failed the recruiting examination. See note 26 supra. The foreseeable conse-
quences approach would dictate that since the consequences of a failure to act differently were
foreseeable, the defendant was guilty of a constitutional violation. The Court, however, made
no finding of discriminatory intent. 426 U.S. at 248.
11 Some commentators assert that Washington and Arlington Heights might have cre-
ated an insurmountable burden to equal protection plaintiffs, see TiBE, supra note 2, at 1031;
Note, Constitutional Significance of Racially Disproportionate Impact, 90 HA{v. L. Rav. 114,
120 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Significance]; Note, Proof of Discriminatory Intent, 91 HARV.
L. Rav. 163, 172" (1977) [hereinafter cited as Proof], because proof of a subjective standard
of intent is virtually impossible. Therefore, most plaintiffs would be precluded from relying
on the fourteenth amendment to rectify equal protection violations. But see text accompany-
ing notes 53-56 supra & 132-39 infra.
5, See Proof, supra note 58, at 166; note 45 supra.
" In the context of an intentional tort, specific intent refers to the desire to accomplish
a particular result. See PaossEm, supra note 53, at § 8. If A and B are hunting and A sees the
bushes move and immediately fires, striking B, A is negligent in his conduct. If A aims
directly at B, however, intending that the bullet hit B, A has committed an intentional tort
against B. While the physical act of pulling the trigger is identical in both instances, the
difference involves A's state of mind. A does not have to be absolutely certain that the bullet
will strike B or that B will be harmed, but he must be "substantially certain" of the result.
RsrATE M T, supra note 53, at § 8A, comment B; see Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertance,
1979]
120 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Although the Arlington Heights Court never specifically stated such a
requirement, this conclusion is unmistakable. The foreseeable conse-
quences of both action and inaction were obvious," but the Court found
no constitutional violation in either Arlington Heights"2 or Washington."
In listing the types of evidence 4 a fact-finder should consider when deter-
mining intent, the Court impliedly rejected the foreseeable consequences
approach. The evidence viewed as important by the Court does not prove
the foreseeability of the consequences, since the majority in Arlington
Heights directed the fact-finder's attention to those elements that moti-
vated the actor. 5 The Court was not concerned with what the actor should
have known, but rather the considerations that prompted his decision.
Finally, the Court used the words purpose and intent interchangeably" in
holding that discriminatory intent had to be a "motivating factor"" in the
government's decision. This choice of words implies that a fact-finder must
consider the actual motives or "specific intent" of the governmental
actor. 8 Therefore, proof of the specific intent to discriminate requires that
the plaintiff prove more than the discriminatory impact of the action."8 In
contrast, the plaintiff would not need to prove discriminatory intent if
courts adopt the foreseeable consequences approach."
Following Washington and Arlington Heights, plaintiffs realized that
they had to prove a governmental decision-maker's subjective intent or
specific purpose to bring about a discriminatory result before seeking the
invalidation of a facially neutral statute on fourteenth amendment
grounds.7 ' Although numerous federal courts have considered the guide-
lines and requirements of Washington and Arlington Heights, they have
exhibited confusion in their application. 2 Some courts merely have found
and Indifference: The Relation of Mental State to Negligence, 39 HAv. L. Rxv. 849, 860
(1926); Seavey, Negligence, 41 HARV. L. REv. 1, 17 (1927); Proof, supra note 58, at 166-67.
See notes 56-57 supra.
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
" See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
'3 The historical background, the specific sequence of events, and the legislative and
administrative history of the decision all indicate that a court should focus on each actor and
the facts of each situation, rather than a general inquiry about what the actor might have
known. 429 U.S. at 267-68.
" 429 U.S. at 265; see Schwemm, supra note 9, at 1021.
'7 429 U.S. at 265-66, 270.
"See note 60 supra.
See notes 53-58 supra.
70 Since Washington and Arlington Heights, the Court has been quick to reject cases
employing the foreseeable consequences approach, remanding them for reconsideration in
light of Washington and Arlington Heights. See Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672 (1977);
Austin Ind. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1977). See also Proof, supra note 58,
at 166.
71 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
n See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1046-47 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977); Socialist Workers Party v. Chicago Bd. of Election, 433 F. Supp.
11, 14 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
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the existence or non-existence of discriminatory intent without discussing
the evidence used to reach such a conclusion," while other courts have
commented on the inferences drawn from each of the Arlington Heights
categories of evidence. 74
The courts must determine intent on a case-by-case basis due to the
different fact situations of each controversy. The starting point for such
analysis under the Supreme Court's guidelines involves the impact of the
governmental action.75 If the outcome of the facially neutral decision does
not have a disproportionate impact on some identifiable minority group,
no further fourteenth amendment analysis is necessary. 6 The only man-
ageable way to measure the disproportionate impact of a facially neutral
statute has been through the use of statistical analysis.7 7 Until the plaintiff
has affirmatively demonstrated that his particular minority group has
been affected adversely, the plaintiff is not deemed to have suffered a
constitutional injury.78 The situation reflected by a particular set of statis-
tics, however, is often controversial.79 Obvious disproportionate impact to
a plaintiff may not always be apparent to a fact-finder. 0 Since the fact-
" See, e.g., Dawson v. Pastrick, 441 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Ind. 1977); Bannerman v.
Department of Youth Auth., 436 F. Supp. 1273 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
7' See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. South
Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977), affld, 98 S. Ct. 756 (1978).
7 See note 45 supra.
7' See Inmates of Neb. Penal v. Greenholtz, 567 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1977); Cave v.
Beame, 433 F. Supp. 172 (E.D. N.Y. 1977). The plaintiff must plead disproportionate impact
as well as discriminatory intent to state a cause of action. See Philadelphia Council of Neighb.
Organs. v. Coleman, 437 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affl'd, 578 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978);
Johnson v. Hoffman, 424 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd sub nom. 572 F.2d 1219 (8th
Cir. 1978); Hammons v. Scott, 423 F. Supp. 618 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
Statistical studies have been significant in proving disproportionate impact and discrimina-
tion in a wide range of cases. Id. Statistics are significant as evidence due to the number of
people involved and the length of time over which an equal protection violation is commonly
alleged. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977) (eleven years); United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977),
affl'd, 98 S. Ct. 756 (1978) (thirty years).
78 See, e.g., Inmates of Neb. Penal v. Greenholtz, 567 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1977); Cave v.
Beame, 433 F. Supp. 172 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
71 Disputes arise over the use of statistics when the parties cannot agree on the figures
on which the study should be based or the time span to be considered. For example, in
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), the plaintiff wanted to look at grand jury selection
figures for an eleven year period, while the defendant wanted to use a two and one-half year
period. The shorter period demonstrated less of a disproportionate impact than the longer
period. Id. at 496.
N Since a perfect statistical norm is rarely obtained in non-laboratory situations, an
important consideration involves how much disparity from the norm should be allowed before
a disproportionate impact is found. In Washington, the fact that four times as many blacks
as whites failed Test 21 evidenced a disproportionate impact. 426 U.S. at 237. In Arlington
Heights, the refusal to rezone affected more blacks than whites, thereby causing a dispropor-
tionate impact. 429 U.S at 269. In the case of a rigidly structured, easily-analyzed itatistical
pattern, the Supreme Court has determined that a difference of more than two standard
deviations from the norm demonstrates a disproportionate impact. Castaneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482, 497 (1977); see, e.g., Inmates of Neb. Penal v. Greenholtz, 567 F.2d 1368, 1377 (8th
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finder must make the determination of disproportionate impact on a case-
by-case basis,8 ' the court must insure that the procedures used to make this
decision are both flexible and capable of working substantial justice.
Another type of evidence probative of intent involves the historical
background of the governmental decision.82 This evidence becomes signifi-
cant when the challenged decision was not made with an apparent discrim-
inatory purpose, yet a clear disproportionate impact results. Since the
discriminatory system has been maintained, plaintiffs allege that the for-
mer decision has not been corrected as a result of discriminatory pur-
poses. Bolden v. City of Mobile" illustrates this type of situation. In
Bolden, the plaintiffs claimed that a 1909 statute" seriously diluted8 the
voting strength of blacks in the city of Mobile, Alabama." The historical
background demonstrated that the 1909 decision was "race proof"88 since
the Alabama constitution effectively disenfranchised blacks in 1901.89
Cir. 1977). But see Berry v. Cooper, 577 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1978) (two standard deviation
approach not a rigid rule).
11 Although the Court in Washington and Arlington Heights stated that impact alone
does not prove a fourteenth amendment violation, 426 U.S. at 239; 429 U.S. at 264-65, jury
selection cases have provided an exception to that broad rule. In Washington, the Court
specifically noted the jury selection cases as an example of a total exclusion of a minority
group which could not be explained on any ground other than racial discrimination. 426 U.S.
at 242. The Court followed this reasoning in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), in
which a large disproportionate impact could not be justified by any legitimate reason. Dispro-
portionate impact will prove discriminatory intent in a limited number of situations because
of the severe statistical disparity in the cases cited in Washington. See, e.g., Akins v. Texas,
325 U.S. 398 (1945); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886). When intent is not required, as under the Fair Housing Act and Title VII, dispropor-
tionate impact alone remains a sufficient test. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
See note 46 supra.
See Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978) (voter dilution); Blacks United for
Lasting Leadership v. City of Shreveport, 571 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1978) (voter dilution);
Thomasville Branch of the N.A.A.C.P. v. Thomas County, 571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1978) (voter
dilution); Feeney v. Commonwealth, 451 F. Supp. 143 (D.Mass. 1978) (discrimination against
women under a veterans preference statute).
- 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978).
The plaintiffs in Bolden alleged that Alabama Code title 37, § 426 (Cum. Stipp. 1973),
was enacted and maintained for discriminatory reasons. The statute allows the at-large
election of city aldermen in certain situations.
" The Fifth Circuit set the standards for judging voter dilution in Zimmer v. McKeithen,
485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish
School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). These standards involve the group's accessibility
to political processes, the responsiveness of representatives to the needs of the group, the
weight of the state policy behind at-large districting, and the effect of past discrimination
upon the electoral participation of the group. 485 F.2d at 1305. Facts which may enhance the
underlying dilution include the size of the district, the segment of the vote necessary for
election if the positions are not individually contested, the number of candidates an elector
must vote for, and whether candidates must reside in sub-districts. Id.





Therefore, since the legislators could not have been concerned about blacks
voting, dilution of those votes would not have been a consideration in
passing the statute."0 The court rejected the proposition that Washington
and Arlington Heights required discriminatory intent only at the time of
the enactment of the governmental decision" and held unconstitutional a
plan that devalued black votes if maintained specifically for discrimina-
tory purposes, even though the plan was instituted without discriminatory
intent."2 This rationale impliedly recognizes an affirmative duty on the
part of the appropriate governmental officials to act when they realize the
reasonably foreseeable consequences of their inaction. The proper focus of
a court, however, should not be whether the consequences of inaction are
foreseeable, but whether the inaction is motivated by the specific desire
to discriminate." Recognition of the consequences of such inaction is not
a constitutional violation," yet the foreseeability of the consequences may
be a factor leading to the finding of intentional discrimination. 5
Instances in which there is direct evidence of intent are rare. 9 There-
fore, a fact-finder must draw inferences from the presentation of circum-
stantial evidence, Three types of such evidence recognized by the, Court
in Arlington Heights include the specific sequence of events leading to the
decision,97 the procedural or substantive ,departuries from the norm in
connection with the decision," and the legislative or administrative history
of the decision." Since the Court gave these three categories little indepen-
dent consideration, they may be considered together as the "totality of the
circumstances." Consideration of all three types of evidence under one
grouping facilitates the understanding of their importance. The categories
are so interrelated that a departure from the normal sequence of events is
often part of the legislative history, as well as one of the specific events
leading to the decision. The totality of the circumstances is most probative
of intent when the decision-making process involves the repetition of an
established pattern.' Where similar decisions have previously been made,
See id.
"Id. The Fifth Circuit had held that discriminatory motive was a prerequisite to claims
under the fifteenth and fourteenth amendments. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 220 (5th Cir.
1978).
1 571 F.2d at 246.
13 The Bolden court concluded that the defendant had the requisite discriminatory intent
because the "legislature was acutely conscious of the racial consequences of its districting
policies." Id.
"1 See text accompanying notes 54-59 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 52-57 supra.
"See, e.g., Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). In Prince
Edward County, the president of the school board specifically stated that the County would
not operate integrated schools. Id. at 222.
429 U.S. at 267.
"Id.
" Id. at 268.
'" In Arlington Heights, the Village had considered many petitions for rezoning from
1959 to 1970. Each petition had been dealt with in the same manner. 429 U.S. at 269. The
Plan Commission attempted to accommodate MHDC by scheduling two extra meetings to
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thought processes are more apparent, and prior responses to those situa-
tions are a matter of record. By comparing these prior responses to the
current response, the fact-finder can determine the actor's actual intent.','
The totality of the circumstances approach also is probative of intent when
the governmental actor has a choice between two alternative plans, one
less discriminatory than the other. 0 If the actor chooses the more discrimi-
natory alternative, the choice itself can be considered one of the specific
events demonstrative of intent, and in most situations the choice will
represent a departure from the norm.0 3 In Arthur v. Nyquist, 104 the city of
Buffalo, New York adopted the concept of a "neighborhood school sys-
allow MHDC to present its case fully. Id. at 269-70. These meetings were important since
they were open to the public. The Commission's procedures and rationales for decision were
publically scrutinized and were later reviewed by a court. When a decision-making process
is hidden from the public eye, however, such as in the jury selection process, there can be no
judicial examination of procedures. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to introduce evidence concern-
ing the totality of the circumstances due to the secretive nature of the defendant's procedures,
the defendant should have discriminatory inferences drawn against him. See Castanada v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
" Under the foreseeable consequences approach, the outcome of prior responses could
be viewed as determinative of an intent in the present situation. See note 57 supra. If the
outcome of a prior decision is reached again, the result of the second decision would be
considered "foreseeable" under the foreseeable consequences test. Therefore the decision-
maker would be deemed to have acted with discriminatory intent. While the foreseeability
of the outcome is not irrelevant, a court should look to the actual motivation of the decision-
maker. See note 60 supra. Only if his motives are discriminatory has he committed an equal
protection violation. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); notes 60 & 70 supra.
The totality of the circumstances approach is more beneficial when dealing in an admin-
istrative setting, since legislative enactments are often isolated occurrences and offer no
substantial means of comparison. Since the foreseeable consequences approach is so easily
manipulated, many courts have used it in evaluating legislative enactments. See, e.g., Feeney
v. Commonwealth, 451 F. Supp. 143 (D. Mass. 1978).
02 The fact that an actor chooses one alternative over another is not alone significant
when the decision is facially neutral. See De FactolDe Jure, supra note 2, at 337. The choice
of one alternative over another, however, is determinative of intent only if the actor's choice
was motivated by discriminatory concerns. Id. Legitimate considerations may always moti-
vate such a choice. See note 40 supra.
"0 In Arlington Heights, the decision by the Village Plan Commission to deny rezoning
represented a departure from the norm since the vast majority of previous petitions had been
approved. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 412
(7th Cir. 1975). In certain situations a mechanical application of established procedures and
rationales may be as probative of intent as deviations from those procedures. If the situation
mandates that standard operating procedures should not be followed, strict adherence to past
practices would be discriminatory. Therefore, a deviation from the established pattern would
be required to correct a disproportionate impact. See De Facto/De Jure, supra note 2, at 337.
But see United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 543 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 946 (1975). For example, where a school board has adopted a neighborhood school
policy, see note 105 infra, a break in this policy should not be immediately viewed as discrimi-
natory, especially if portions of the school district contain racially segregated housing. Strict
adherence to the policy, which would insure segregated schools, would be more probative of
discriminatory intent than a departure from normal procedures. See De Facto/De Jure, supra
note 2, at 337.
104 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1978).
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tern.""' A deviation from normal procedures arose from a decision to per-
mit white students to transfer from their neighborhood schools if such
schools did not offer instruction in a particular foreign language., 6 Other
events that may fall within the category of the totality of the circumstances
because they are probative of the intent of the decision-maker include
sudden changes in attendance zones,07 operation of optional areas,"°s ad-
mission policies to regular and vocational schools,'" the recruiting and
assignment of staff members,10 intact busing,"' the failure to utilize avail-
able land for school placement," 2 rating or ranking only minority teach-
ers,"3 and sudden zoning changes in the face of proposed integrated hous-
ing."' In each of these situations, the outcome is probably foreseeable.
Nevertheless, focusing on the outcome of the decision rather than the
motivation behind the decision ignores the intent requirement of
Washington and Arlington Heights. Although the totality of the circum-
stances and the foreseeable consequences tests are useful aids in determin-
ing the intent of a governmental actor, in proving a fourteenth amendment
violation the plaintiff must show that the defendant had the specific intent
to discriminate."'
Specific application of the intent requirement often leads to conflicting
results. Recently, a United States District Court employed a novel but
questionable approach to the intent requirement by invalidating a facially
neutral statute with a disproportionate impact on women. In Feeney v.
'1 Id. at 144. The rationale behind a neighorhood school policy envisions that a child
attend his local or neighborhood school. In theory, this increases parental interest in the
school, lowers the cost of transportation for both the parent and the school system, and
enhances student morale. Northcross v. Board of Educ., 466 F.2d 890, 896 (6th Cir. 1972),
(Weick, J., dissenting). The neighborhood school system may be indicative of intent if the
system has been employed with the intent to discriminate. See Swann v. Board of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971); Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1978).
"1 573 F.2d at 144. In some instances the school board used different standards for black
student "language transfers" than for whites. Id. White students transferred at will, while
blacks often had to meet stringent requirements. Id.
"M Id. See also Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d 243, 253-54 (6th Cir..1978); Penick v.
Columbus Bd. of Educ., 583 F.2d 787, 795 (6th Cir. 1978); Armstrong v. O'Connell, 451 F.
Supp. 817, 861 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
M See 573 F.2d at 144; Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 583 F.2d at 795.
' 573 F.2d at 144.
"'Id.; Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d at 253; Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 583 F.2d
at 795.
"I Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. 708, 783 (N.D. Ohio 1976). Intact busing occurs when
all the students in a particular school grade are bused from an all-black school to an all-white
school, or vice versa, and kept together for the entire school day. Armstrong v. O'Connell,
451 F. Supp. 817, 853 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
112 See Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d 243, 255 (6th Cir. 1978); Armstrong v. O'Connell,
451 F. Supp. at 861; Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. at 708.
"I Harkless v. Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 554 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
966 (1977).
UI Resident.Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1074 (1978).
M See notes 60, 65 & 70 supra.
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Commonwealth,116 a court reviewed a veterans' preference statute"7 which
gave veterans an absolute preference"' over non-veterans in the appoint-
ment of civil service jobs. The woman plaintiff, a non-veteran personnel
coordinator,"' applied for a higher level civil service job and was ranked
behind several veteran applicants in order of preference."'0 Since most of
these veterans obtained lower scores than she on the same civil service
examination, the plaintiff challenged the ranking system of the veterans'
preference statute on equal protection grounds."' The district court, in a
pre-Washington decision,"' held that discriminatory intent was not neces-
sary to establish a fourteenth amendment violation."3 On remand from the
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Washington, the majority
held that Washington was not controlling and that the veterans' prefer-
ence statute violated the fourteenth amendment."' The court employed
the foreseeable consequences approach,1z stating that the requisite intent
was determined by disproportionate impact,"' the lack of job related-
ness,"' and the failure of Massachusetts officials to recruit qualified fe-
male employees for civil service positions."' In addition, the majority con-
cluded that the statute was not facially neutral, 129 since it advanced a
policy slanted in favor of men which had more than an incidental effect
on hiring opportunities for women."10 The court reasoned that the legisla-
ture was aware that the total number of female veterans comprised only
two percent of the entire military population."' Therefore, the veterans'
preference statute was not facially neutral, but constituted a classification
based on sex.13' The court, however, mistakenly used evidence normally
employed to determine the intent of a facially neutral statute to conclude
that the Massachusetts legislature had intended to maintain' a classifi-
"' 451 F. Supp. 143 (D. Mass.), review granted, 97 S. Ct. 345 (1978).
"' MAss. GEN. LAWS, ANN. ch. 31, § 23 (West 1971).
' Id. Under the Massachusetts statute, applicants who passed the civil service exam
were placed on an "eligibles list." The list of eligibles was then ranked in order of composite
scores by disabled veterans, other veterans, widows, and widowed mothers of veterans and
all other eligible applicants. Id.
" Anthony v. Commonwealth, 415 F. Supp. 485, 492 (D. Mass. 1976), vacated and
remanded per curiam sub nom. Massachusetts v. Feeney, 434 U.S. 884 (1977).
120 Id.
"I The complaint in Feeney was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Since a
violation of § 1983 also requires intent, the court applied constitutional standards. See note
22 supra.
'I Anthony v. Commonwealth, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976).
In Id. at 497.
12 Feeney v. Commonwealth, 451 F. Supp. 143, 144 (D. Mass. 1978).
I25 d. at 147; see notes 53-57 supra.
' 451 F. Supp. at 148.
127 Id.
12 Id. at 149.
I Id. at 147.
'3 Id., citing Anthony v. Commonwealth, 415 F. Supp. 485, 495 (D. Mass. 1976).
"1 451 F. Supp. at 148.
'1 Id. at 147; see notes 8-9 supra.
" The original veterans' preference statute was passed in 1895. 451 F. Supp. at 148.
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cation based on sex.' u Once a court determines that a statute is non-
neutral, intent is to be inferred from the establishment of a suspect classifi-
cation.' The reasoning employed by the court in Feeney is directly con-
trary to the reasoning of other federal courts that have considered veterans'
preference statutes.' ' In applying "strict scrutiny""'3 to a facially neutral
statute with a disproportionate impact, the court allowed the plaintiff
virtually to circumvent the intent requirement of Washington, and utilized
the foreseeable consequences approach in a unique fashion. The Feeney
court, by applying the foreseeable consequences approach, transformed a
facially neutral statute'ls which did not differentiate between men and
women, into a statute which supposedly created a suspect classification.
Strict scrutiny is an inappropriate standard of review in such a situation
because of the procedure outlined by the Supreme Court in Arlington
Heights.'3' In using evidence of intent to infer the existence of a suspect
classification, the Feeney court misapplied the Washington and Arlington
Heights standards by focusing on the standard of review rather than the
existence of discriminatory intent."9 If followed, the Feeney approach
could lead to the invalidation of every state's veterans preference statute.,
The discriminatory intent requirement of Washington v. Davis4 2 and
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.,"I will bar numerous plaintiffs from proving constitutional viola-
tions, especially if intent is necessary for proof of a thirteenth or fifteenth
amendment claim.' The foreseeable consequences approach 5 and the
Feeney rationale,' 4' however, reduce the plaintiffs burden of proof by elim-
inating the requirement of presenting direct evidence of purposeful dis-
Since there were virtually no women in the military in 1895, the enactment could not have
been passed with discriminatory intent. The violation resulted when the statute was main-
tained despite the addition of women into the military. Id. This approach specifically imposes
an affirmative duty on the part of the legislature to act. See text accompanying notes 88-93
supra.
'' See notes 8-9 supra.
"" See note 13 supra.
'l See, e.g., Rios v. Dillman, 499 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1974); Branch v. DuBois, 418 F.
Supp. 1128 (N.D. 111. 1976); Wisconsin Nat'l Organ. for Women v. Wisconsin, 417 F. Supp.
978 (W.D. Wis. 1976). See also Note, Veterans Public Employment Preference as Sex
Discrimination: Anthony v. Massachusetts and Branch v. Dubois, 90 HARv. L. R.v. 805
(1977); Note, Constitutional Law, 23 WAYNE L. Rxv. 1435 (1977).
'37 See notes 8-9 supra.
'n MASS. GEN. LAWS, ANN. ch. 31 § 23 (West 1971); see note 118 supra.
'' 429 U.S. at 270; see text accompanying note 43 supra.
"' See note 9 supra.
" Only Hawaii, Iowa, and New Hampshire do not have veterans preference statutes of
some type. As of January 25, 1977 there were 29,607,000 veterans in the United States.
Fleming & Shanor, Veterans' Preference in Public Employment: Unconstitutional Gender
Discrimination?, 26 EMOaY L. J. 13, 13 (1977).
142 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
1 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
"I See note 22 supra.
"4 See notes 52-57 supra.
," See text accompanying notes 125-141 supra.
1979]
128 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
criminatory intent.' 7 Notwithstanding the foreseeable consequences ap-
proach and the Feeney rationale, the Court's recent requirement'8 will
lead to the increasing use of Title VII'9 and the Fair Housing Act,"' which
do not require proof of discriminatory intent."' The major impact of the
intent requirement will be in the area of school desegregation, since these
plaintiffs depend on the fourteenth amendment for relief and cannot uti-
lize any statutory enactment that does not require intent.12 Only through
close scrutiny of a decision-maker's past practices and motivations will a
plaintiff be able to prove that a facially neutral decision with a dispropor-
tionate impact violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Therefore, plaintiffs may find an insurmountable burden
awaiting them because of the inherent difficulties surrounding the proof
of specific discriminatory intent. '"
THOMAS B. HENSON
" See text accompanying notes 56-59 & 133-141 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976).
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-03 (1976).
"' See note 22 supra.
' Neither Title VII nor the Fair Housing Act are aimed at the particular discriminatory
practice which causes segregated schools. See note 22 supra.
I" See Comment, Intent in the Criminal Law: The Legal Tower of Babel, 8 CATH. U. L.
Ray. 31 (1959).
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